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Endsars in retrospect: State's internal dynamics and the fate of political protest in a democratic Nigeria

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Abstract

Nigeria, 2020. We explore the EndsARS to make a statement: While frustration and democratic political structures encourage political protest and dictate the dimensions it takes, certain internal dynamics of the state may, in collaboration with democratic structures, still stand antithetical to protest. This is usually in terms of the potentiality of the protest to serve as catalyst for fundamental changes or mere policy reactions; or, in the extreme, return the polity to status quo ante. We reveal that in Nigeria, secessionist threats, resource control agitations and ethno-religious tension are these state's internal dynamics, and, with the democratic structures, they speak theoretically to how the EndsARS has so far played out and will likely end. In 2017 the EndsARS began as online campaigns. By 2020 it had metamorphosed into popular demonstrations that resulted in the October 2020 Lekki Massacre; followed by episodic riots, looting and arsons. The February 13 2020 action at the Lagos Lekki Toll Gate shows that the repressive state has recuperated, so, like others before it, the EndsARS may die a natural death.

Keywords: *EndsARS; Political Protest; State's Internal Dynamics; Nigeria; Democratic Environment; Policy Reactions*

ENDSARS rétrospective : La Dynamique interne de l'État et les résultats des contestations politiques dans un Etat démocratique comme le Nigéria

Résumé

Nigeria, 2020. Nous exploiterons l'ENDSARS pour faire une déclaration : alors que la frustration et les principes démocratiques encouragent les protestations politiques, certains Etats mettent sur pied des structures légitimes pour étouffer ces protestations. Il s'agit généralement de ces genres de protestation qui servent de catalyseur pour déclencher des profonds changements ou pour maintenir le statu quo. Nous rappellerons qu'au Nigeria, les menaces sécessionnistes, les agitations pour le contrôle des ressources et les tensions ethno-religieuses sont la dynamique interne de cet État et, avec les structures démocratiques, elles expliquent théoriquement comment l'EndSARS s'est jusqu'à présent déroulé et prendra probablement fin. En 2017, EndSARS a commencé sous forme de campagnes en ligne. En 2020, il s'était métamorphosé en manifestations populaires qui ont abouti au massacre de Lekki en octobre 2020 ; suivies d'émeutes épisodiques, de pillages et d'incendies criminels. L'action du 13 février 2020 au péage de Lagos Lekki montre que l'État répressif s'est rétabli, donc, comme d'autres avant lui, l'EndSARS peut mourir de mort naturelle.

Mots-clés: *EndSARS ; Manifestation politique ; Dynamique interne de l'État ; Nigeria; Environnement démocratique ; Réactions politiques*

Background

The EndSARS political protest began as a campaign in 2017 when a petition signed by 10,195 people was submitted to Nigeria's National Assembly, calling for a total disbandment of the Special Anti-Robbery Squads, SARS, whose officials were accused of reckless killing and harassment of young Nigerians and extortion of money from their relatives (Salaudeen 2017). The protest was first launched on the social media, but it soon gave way to episodic peaceful rallies and civil disobedience in major Nigerian cities and states. The first reaction of the Nigerian State through the Nigeria Police Force was declaration of campaigners as criminals and robbers who wanted the Special Anti-Robbery Squared off the road (Erunke 2017). Further state handling from 2017 had been particularly interesting as the SARS was banned many times but the operatives remained on the road due largely to court cases between the Inspector General of Police and The Police Service Commission over who has the final authority to recruit, dissolve and deploy policemen (The Cable News 23 October 2020).

By their nature, protests often expand as they endure. They can also manifest in camping and fun, with shared and reciprocal emotions. So would the EndSARS continue for the next three years until it took the dimension of street demonstrations following the Ugeli Trigger of October 2020. Aljazeera had reported that "on Saturday 3 October 2020, a video started trending on social media showing a SARS police officer shoot a young Nigerian in front of Wetland Hotel, Ughelli, Delta State, and it was alleged that the police team took away the young man's vehicle – a Lexus SUV" (News, 9 October 2020). Okoh (2020) adds that "the trending video caused public outcry on social media, especially on Twitter, with the #ENDSARS hashtag attending".

Following these events were weeks of outcry and anger with videos and pictures showing police brutality, harassment and extortion in Nigeria, and nation-wide street demonstrations began on Thursday 8th of October 2020. The protest demonstrations enjoyed participation mainly from young Nigerians and celebrities who eventually blocked many roads as the participating crowds increased. The Nigerian state responded with teargas, water cannons and shooting; leading to the death of one Jimoh Isiaq in Ogbomoso, Oyo State. From this point the action intensified across Nigeria (Busari, Orji & Salaudeen, CNN, 2020).

The October killing was the trigger of protest rallies, and the entire protest activities climb the 'n' hill quickly. By October 20, the EndSARS had got to the summit of 'n'. The Nigerian introduced a fatal violence that has come to be known as The Lekki Massacre. The violence dropped the protest actions from the 'n' summit down to the ground, and this was followed by riots, arsons and lootings that sometimes had ethno-religious and sectorial colorations. In all, EndSARS started in 2017, passed through several stages and led to such death, injuries, arson and looting that attracted global attention. The behaviouralist will be particularly interested in why it dragged for three years as online protest campaigns but suddenly transformed to rallies and riots within 8 days. What theoretical labeling does the transformation give to the protester and the Nigerian political environment? What is the fate of EndSARS while it is still on? Will it provoke fundamental social changes or return Nigeria to the status quo?

Political protest

By political protest we often refer to "rallies, demonstrations, riots and strikes which have an expressed political target and, or involve conflict behaviour against the political machinery" (Auvinen 1996: 78). It "refers to public group activities utilizing confrontation politics to apply stress to specific target for the purpose of affecting public policy" (Tercheck, 1974:133, cited in Kritzer, 2001:630). Political protest is

often situated within the context of political behaviour, but doing so may elicit the question of whether it is such regular attitudes as skepticism and apathy; or a high risk behaviour such as riot, hunger strike, self-immolation and suicide bombing that have all been historically associated to it. This is perhaps why Opp asserts that while “protest refers to behaviour, there is disagreement on what form of behaviour constitutes protest,” amongst other contentious political activities as boycott, sit-ins, street blockage, riot, arson, terrorist attack, hunger strike and suicide bombing. This position is also shared by others scholars such as Mendes (1999), Jonathan (2003) and Olafsson (2007) who believe that riot, terrorism and suicide bombing are also non institutional forms of relating to the authority, and that it might be difficult to clearly dichotomize them from protest as political behaviour.

Categorization may as well be a matter of scholarly orientation, considering how attention of scholarly research is favorably skewed towards voting, elections and psephology as ‘regular’ forms of political behaviour; much over activities of political protest and social movement (Schussman and Soule 2005). A host of scholars perceive political protest as a normal form of political participation (e.g. Freeman, 1999 & Schussman and Soule, 2005), but others such as Useem and Useem (2001) and Herring (1989) for instance, consider it not normal; perhaps deviant. Even in what appears a psycho-analysis of contentious politics, Kaplan and Xiaoru (2000) posit that political protest is deviant behaviour, and that individuals who participate in it often do so in order to compensate for some lacuna in their personality or achievement. They highlight the works of others who “have hypothesized that participation in political protest reflects the need to increase one’s self feelings of self-worth, or to reduce a person’s feeling of unworthiness” (p. 599), and from these they assert that while participating in political protest, social tasks that are ordinarily too heavy for an individual to attain become easy in groups (p. 599).

Furthermore, and as if directly responding to Useem and Useem’s (2001) position that political protest is a non-conventional form of political participation and “a high risk political behaviour”, Soule (2005) contends that political protest is “inherently political”, not a misnomer; and that in the neo liberal polity especially, it has become “a taken for granted part of the repertoire of citizens’ political activities” (1084). Soule observes that resistance, political protest and other contentious activities increase as voting and other forms of political participation decrease, and that since they share such compensatory roles, “it makes little sense to limit analysis of political behaviour to voting and electoral activities”(p.1084) without including political protest as a normal, regular part. Schussman and Soule (2005), Charles (1996) and Jasper (1998) also consider political protest as one of the many forms of interacting with elites, opponents or the state. To them, political protest and other forms of contentious politics are regular and normal forms of political participation (Kittel and Opp 2018). Indeed, there is a way in which it can be argued that any behaviour that has explainable cause cannot be unexpected in the society, and thus will be difficult to categorise as not normal. Since there seems to be no disagreement that political protest “involves attempts by individuals or groups to address or stop perceived injustices within a political system” (Encyclopedia.com, 2020), what is undeniable is that some form of it does occur in reaction to certain actions or in actions in all political formations. Based on these, it cannot but keep attracting research attentions from social scientists around the world.

But a focus on what causes political protest promises more consensus, and this is where theories of political protests and social movements concentrate. The emphasis on causes and forms can be traced to German political philosopher Karl Marx’ idea of necessary and inevitable class struggle that creates perpetual clashes between the proletariat and the bourgeoisie. But Auvinen (1996) further highlights a number of causative factors of political protest through what he calls ‘conceptual model’: bad economic

performance in a state, ethnic dominance, authoritarian political regime and low level of economic development. Auvinen asserts that these factors often lead to relative deprivation, especially amongst the urban middle classes and youths, who, as he claimed, are the direct victims of socio economic situations; and resting his position on Ted Gurr's deprivation theory, Auvinen puts the caveat that a "democratic political environment" which permits "individual and group political association and expression" (p. 383), and where successful protests must have previously held (p. 384) is often conducive for protest and collective action. As a radical departure from the deprivationist and materialist orientation, Falaiye's (2009) intervention over the African-American experience on Black Nationalism would even link political protest to political legitimacy, claiming that it often occurs where "the institutions of the society such as the courts, the traditional political parties, the police and the educational institutions are no longer seen as willing and able to meet the pressing needs" of people. At the same time, others such as Conway and Feigart (1976), as well as many other socialization theorists will insist that the form of political behaviour that an individual exhibits -protest or apathy for example- is primarily a function of agents of socialization such as the family, the school and peer influence that have come to define their personalities over the years.

In situating the songs of Nigeria's Fela Anikulapo Kuti between 1970 and 1997 as expression of political protest against the Nigerian state, Eesuola (2012) focuses on causes and dynamics of political protest in individuals. Eesuola proposes that early or primary socialization especially between the family and school gives what he calls 'protest potentiality', latter or secondary socialization between college age and peer group transforms the protest potentiality to 'protest behaviour' – which may just be exhibited in subtle forms of radical dispositions, counter-culture and deviance or not exhibited at all. Then, still in Eesuola's proposal, the nature of political environment and exposure to alternative worldviews are the determinant of whether or not the protest potentiality or, and protest behaviour will manifest in protest action such as rallies, riots and others. While Eesuola's idea is that there are three interdependent dimensions to political protest in individuals: potentiality, behaviour and action; yet, it focuses on causes as many other theories of political protest and social movements do.

Indeed, theories of political protest and social movement that are dominant in the literature have mainly focused on causes, and, by extension, forms. Within this focus the group approach is topmost, and class cum economic factor is prominent. Literature also shows that participants in political protests are mainly youth and urban middle class who, with their many hopes and aspirations, are mainly affected by every prevailing socio-economic situations in the state. Such a group has self-enhancing consequences, particularly under conditions where they perceive themselves subject to patterns of injustice composed by the conventional order. The tendency for this group to exhibit protest is high under democratic political environments which recognize, at least in theory, expression of interest and demand for accountable leadership. In addition, the literature is quite loud in asserting that every political protest is triggered by certain events which may contagiously lead to others, and that the dimensions that political protests take often differ based on the political environment, structure of economy and social circumstances.

But apart from the causes and trigger as well as dimensions of political protest, literature needs to be enriched in terms of several dynamics that determine the fate of a political protest. Poplar revolutions around the world have strong links with political protests, but so are civil wars, regime change, military overtakes and what, in the case of the Arab Springs, has been widely described as a 'failed revolution' (see Maget 2020 for example). Given that many of these events started with protests, are there internal

dynamics that could have provided early explanations on how and why each of them ended as it did? Are such explanations not best sought when political protests are still ongoing and their nuances are still fresh? These questions create a critical gap in the knowledge of political protest, and it is what we intend to fill in this paper through early engagement of the EndSARS that started as a campaign against police brutality but kept expanding to demand for police reform and better employment opportunities; and that after the October 20 Lekki Massacre, took the patterns of secessionist threats, resource control agitation, ethno-religious politicking and demand for regime end.

One theory that speaks in the dimension of the foregoing is the Political Opportunity Structure, POS. Also called the Political Process Model, the POS provides an ecological explanation of political behaviour, and, as perceived by its main proponent Eisinger (1973), it postulates that the nature of the entire political environment in which a political protest occurs determines whether or not protest will occur in the first place, and the class of people that will initiate or participate in protest. The POS also discusses the forms and dimensions that protest actions take, and the reaction that the political system often gives to it (Opp, 2009; 1263). Eisinger declares that:

Such factors as the nature of the chief executive, the mode of elections, the distribution of social skills and status and the degree of social stratification, taken individually or collectively, serve in various ways to obstruct or facilitate citizens' activities in pursuance of their political goals. Other environmental factors such as the climate of governmental responsiveness and the level of community resources help to establish the chances of success of citizens' political activities. In short, elements in the environment impose certain constraints on political activities or open an avenue for it. The manner in which individual or group in a political system behaves, then, is not simply a function of resources they command, but of the opinions, weak spots, barriers and resources of the political system itself. There is, in this sense, interaction or linkage between the environment, understood in terms of the notion of a structure of political opportunities, and political behaviour (1973: 11-12).

The unmistakable assumption in the foregoing explanation is that political protest action is largely linked to the nature and character of the political environment of protesters. However, Eisinger's perception of political environment is macro and holistic; addressing issues such as, but not limited to, mode of elections, social stratification, distribution of social skills, social distribution and degree of responsiveness of government. But on how all these determine the fate of political protest the POS appears silent. But could O'Connor's (1973) Legitimacy Stability thesis might have attempted to fill in the gap. Legitimacy simply refers to popular or widespread acceptance based on what a group of people dominantly consider right or wrong ideal and odd; that which is in accord with the dominant norms, values, beliefs, practices and procedures accepted by a group of people in a socio-political setting (Bendix, 1969). We use legitimacy to denote the political domain. However, in the ordinary language, the term refers to any activity sanctioned by rules and customary practices...it refers to activities and beliefs widely acceptable to those in polity; the activities and beliefs polity members' relations to one another and to the state as a corporate entity (Cohen, 1985:714). The Legitimacy-Stability thesis is a neo-Marxian explanatory tool for political protest and social movement. Propounded mainly by O'Connor (1973) with latter collaboration by Useem and Useem (1979), the Legitimacy-Stability claims that men protest against the polity if he lacks confidence in the political regime, and that majority of the people in a particular polity will protest or support protest against a political regime that lacks legitimacy.

Police brutality triggered the EndSARS protest. It is a global phenomenon resting on the logic that ordinarily, firearm and other coercive instruments give their possessors a huge advantage over others. The advantage is stronger when the possession is backed by some form of legitimacy that the police enjoy all over the world, but that are sometimes taken beyond acceptable standards and discretions. Emesowum (2016) gives a legal definition of police brutality as excessive and undue use of force against a subject including but not limited to physical or verbal harassment, physical or mental injury, property damage, and or death; in such a way that violates civil rights. The term, in short, refers to the various means through which the police as armed advantaged agents of the state violate human rights through beatings, racial and ethnic abuse, unlawful killings, torture or indiscriminate use of riot control agents during protests (Amnesty International). Amnesty further states that a combination of factors including inadequate laws, racial or other forms of discrimination, insecurity or conflict, and entrenched impunity often make governments routinely trample on other human rights like freedom of expression and peaceful assembly often through authorization of heavy-handed police responses to protests and demonstrations. Based on this, the Legitimacy Stability Thesis will thus raise the question: 'what is the legitimacy capacity of the regime that provoked the EndSARS political protest in Nigeria', and a glance into the country's history is needed to respond to the poser.

The current dominant group and ruling elite in Nigeria became predators of the state as soon as they took over the control of the polity from the colonial masters in 1960. Their perpetual theft of state resources made it difficult for the political system to work towards coalescing values that would institute hegemony and create social order necessary for development. So, to reinforce their anomie, the ruling elite concentrated on developing the coercive instrumentalities of the state rather than the state itself in the aspect of economic base. This created venal police and mercenary military that, until 1999, took over political power and continued to operate forged, oppressive and kleptomaniac regimes, with politics of strategic exclusion and alienation of citizens.

The foregoing contradictions expectedly snowballed into socio-economic paradoxes. Before, and as at the 2017 when the EndSARS began, and up till now, Nigeria has been a middle-income mixed economy and an emerging market with expanding manufacturing, financial, service, communications, technology and entertainment sectors (Nigerian Consulate Frankfurt 2020). Currently, the Country is ranked as the 27th-largest globally based on nominal GDP, and the 24th-largest on the basis of purchasing power parity (worldbank.org, 2020). Also, Nigeria has the largest economy in Africa; its re-emergent manufacturing sector became the largest on the continent in 2013, and it produces a large proportion of goods and services for the West African subcontinent (Manufacturing Sector Report 2015). In addition, the debt-to-GDP ratio is 16.075 percent as of 2019 ("UPDATE Nigeria Government Debt: % of GDP" 2019).

The endline of the paradox is that Nigeria of the foregoing character is also regarded as the poverty capital of the world recently exceeding India with the largest rate of people living in extreme poverty (Borgen Magazine 2020). About 86.9 of her citizens' lives in severe poverty, which is about 50% of its entire population. While the nation is smaller both geographically and in terms of population, it is failing at lowering the rates of poverty. This is partly due to the mismanagement of the oil business and the presence of corruption. Along with this, the nation is going through a "population boom," which will make managing poverty rates more difficult. One of the U.N.'s Sustainable Development Goals is to end extreme poverty by 2050. However, Nigeria's poverty rates are currently going in the wrong direction as it has created unemployment and inequalities that constantly destroy the nation's economic

framework. In Nigeria, corruption is the major reason why poverty is at such a high. It exist in the everyday lives of citizens from businesses to the government making poorer communities suffer and subjecting the economic structure to disruption. Many economist have declared that it is the “single greatest obstacle” that prevents the country from prospering.

In line with postulation of Auvinem, urban middle classes and youths generally are either the directly affected or at the receiving end of these economic disasters, and that theoretically suggests why they are the major actors in the 2020 EndSARS protest. Operating under these economic conditions, some of the Nigerian urban middle class and youth who could not assess succor or alternatives began to give in for social anomie, specifically in the forms of internet fraud and robbery. Anomie theories have collectively agreed that when the society sets certain standards for members without providing legitimate means of achieving the standards, members go illegitimate. The resolve of some Nigerian youth to seek illegitimate alternative led to the creation of SARS, and the officials too, being victims of the same system, soon became consumed by what produced them. The frustration form this explains both the action of SARS officials to engage in brutality and excessive use of force that led to the protest in 2017. Furthermore, the socio economic situations in the country created such imbalances that made several groups revisit their situations and positions within Nigeria, and this led to the attempts by many of them to de-legitimise the state through secessionist threats and resource control agitation found in Southern Nigeria, as well as ethno-religious hypersensitivity found in the north of the country.

Conclusion: What is the fate of the EndSARS?

Group political protest is a form political behaviour. It speaks to power relation, almost always. It is often triggered by some particular event (s). What the EndSARS protesters want ended is the Special Anti-Robbery Squad of the Nigerian Police Force. But certain other factors make protest manifest in different forms: episodic deviance, group campaign, legal action, industrial strike, rallies, demonstrations, riot, arson, massacre, looting and the rest. The Nigerian political environment has been laden with bad economic performance ethnic dominance under an authoritarian political regime that lacks respect for the rule of law as even indicated in the extra judicial killings of the SARS, and low level of economic development because, by the end of 2018 a year after the protest began on soft notes, the economy of Nigeria began developing at very slow rates and the country took over from India as the poverty capital of the world (CNNedition.cnn.com > 2018/06/26).

As Jasper (1998) showcases in his emotional dimension to protest and social movement, political protests rallies often expand as they endure, manifesting in camping, fun, with shared and reciprocal emotions. Citing Collins' (1990) definition of emotion as “the glue of solidarity and what mobilizes conflict” (p.399), Jasper observes that all social actions have emotional undertone, political protest inclusive, and that protest initiators and participants are often motivated by shared and reciprocal emotions. These refer to the sentiments they all share, either in terms of ideology or socio economic situation; or the emotion that they have towards one another as a result of interaction and interrelationship over time. Jasper's position often reminds us that early study of protest concentrated on emotion, at a time “when crowd and collective behaviour, not social movement and collective action were the lens for studying protest” (p. 397). The old practice disappeared around the 1970s due to the emergence of new approaches to the study of protest one of which is Gurr's (1970) deprivation theory. Thus, protesters can use any or all of the aforementioned means without being logical or even rational because protest is an expression of emotion, and all protesters want at any point in time is make their voices heard.

Whenever violence is introduced to political protest rallies, either by the protesters resorting to riot due to neglect or repression by the state, or the state itself using excess force on protesters, protest becomes a high risk political behaviour. Once this occurs, the protesting crowd often breaks into two: On one hand the biographically available group which may easily engage in high risk activities because they have very few or no social considerations to dissuade them. Such social considerations range from home, family, personal property, college degrees etc. After the October 20 Lekki Massacre, such people took to the street to begin rioting, arson and looting through which some of them suffered serious consequences and even fatality. The biographically un available group are the opposite, and because in the case eof the EndSARS they are celebrities , college students, educated activists and popular civil society agents who have things to look forward to in the Nigerian society, they withdrew from the street and returned to the online and social media activities. It is category of people that Nigerian popuar musician, Fela Anikulapo Kuti refers to in the lyrics.

My people self dey fear too much
They fear for the things they no see
The fear for the air around them
They fear to fight for freedom
They fear to fight for justice
They fear to fight for happiness
They always get reasons to fear
I no wan die, I wan enjoy
I get one wife, I get some child
Mama dey for house, Papa dey for house
So police man go slap your face you no go talk!
Army man go slap your face you go de look like monkey.....
(Anikulapo Kuti, Fela, Army Arrangement, 1977).

With bipolarization of the protest, ethnic factors and partisan politicking surfaced when opposition political parties and other actors began to engage in action and inaction that could interpret as inciting the protesting youth against the state. The biographically available group of protesters resorted to looting and arson. This state seized the opportunity to react that it was no longer a protest, and that protesters were westerners and Christians who were being mobilized to pull down an administration headed by a northerner and a Muslim. These were the peculiar internal dynamics of Nigeria. Curfew was then renewed and tightened; and soldiers were sent to the streets. With this development the state recuperated and began to consolidate not only the need for her to use additional force, but also to decisively do so in order to resist any re-occurrence of the EndSARS protest.

The diagram uses, from left, the red balls to represent protest actions which started form the 20017 trigger and continued episodically as similar actions occur. The 2020 Warri Massacre however intensified the protest, taking changing from episodic online campaigns to popular street demonstrations. The red spot at the peak represents the October 2020 actions and massacre at the Lekki toll Gate. The events returned the protest actions to episodes; but this time dominated by looters and arsonists who were biographically available to continue the high risk action.

Virtually every event that has come to be eventually defined as revolution begins with some form of protest. Such protests are often the triggers of several other significant events that liberate the political system. There is need, therefore, to capture early protest events and make some theoretical evaluations. If, for instance, Ted Gurr's Frustration and Aggression predicts that revolutions occur due to relative deprivation, there is need to rigorously evaluate a relative deprivation triggered protest in a bid to ascertain other terms and conditions that determine the validity of the thesis. The essence of a theory after all, and which is also the properties that make the theory what it fundamentally is and without which it loses its identity, is its predictive potency. This is why Gabriel (2008) asserts that theories are formulated to explain, predict, and understand phenomena and, in many cases, to challenge and extend existing knowledge within the limits of critical bounding assumptions.

We conclude that while high level of frustration and democratic political environment encourage occurrence of political protest and the dimension it takes, certain internal dynamics of the state and the very democratic structures that aid political protest are also antithetical to its fate in terms of fundamentally altering the status quo, or catalyzing mere policy reactions, or returning the polity to the status quo ante. In Nigeria, secessionist threats, resource control agitations and ethno-religious tension are the state's internal dynamics, and they speak theoretically to how the EndSARS has played out and will most likely end. For the EndSARS, frustration created the aggression that triggered the protest, the political environment fueled it to the level at which it destabilized the state, internal dynamics of Nigeria was explored by the state to recover its stamina and from there, the state has used the same democratic structures to create series of diversions that will ensure that the protest dies down till the end of this administration. Another attempt was made to revive the EndSARS protest in some Nigerian major cities on Monday 8th of December, 2020. With minimal effort this was frustrated by the Nigerian security agents. With the aborted situation of February 13 2021, at the same Lagos Lekki Toll Gate, it does appear that the repressive Nigeria state has recuperated and is ready to utilise unlimited force to repel any semblance of the EndSARS. Like others before it, EndSARS protest demonstrations and rallies have been suppressed by internal dynamics and democratic structures. It heads towards the fate of June 12 and others before it, but will remain a major campaign issue in coming elections in a democratic Nigeria.

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