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Addressing Entry Procedure of Political Asylum Seekers from Sub-Saharan Africa

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Abstract

Beyond argument, Sub-Saharan Africa is a region where there is existence of voluntary migration especially in search of labour. However, people migrate due to several problems such as violent conflicts, governance crisis, corruption, unemployment as well as low standard of living. This paper makes use of historical evidence from written sources to further enrich knowledge on why African people migrate to various places despite their region's abundant natural resources. Findings are that the political landscape is unpredictable and volatile, coupled with unpleasant attitudes of dictatorial regimes that, in some cases, intimidate lots of people especially intellectuals, union leaders and many other groups; and leading to the voluntary migration of professionals. Furthermore, the quality of governance as represented by the political measures of accountability and stability, rule of law, regulatory quality and government effectiveness is abysmal in Africa. Added to this, the paper concludes, is the economic stalemate due to mismanagement of state resources.

Key Words: Voluntary Migration, Labour, sub-Saharan Africa, Political, Conflicts

Résumé

Au-delà de l'argumentation, l'Afrique subsaharienne est une région

où il existe une migration volontaire notamment à la recherche de main-d'œuvre. Cependant, les personnes migrent en raison de plusieurs problèmes tels que les conflits violents, la crise de la gouvernance, la corruption, le chômage ainsi que le faible niveau de vie. Cet article utilise des preuves historiques provenant de sources écrites pour enrichir davantage les connaissances sur les raisons pour lesquelles les Africains migrent vers divers endroits malgré les abondantes ressources naturelles de leur région. Les conclusions sont que le paysage politique est imprévisible et instable, associé à des attitudes désagréables des régimes dictatoriaux qui, dans certains cas, menacent beaucoup de gens, en particulier les intellectuels, les dirigeants syndicaux et de nombreux autres groupes. Tout ceci conduit à la migration volontaire des professionnels. En outre, la qualité de la gouvernance peut être jugée par les mesures politiques de responsabilité et de stabilité, l'Etat de droit, la qualité de la réglementation et l'efficacité du gouvernement. Pourtant, la bonne gouvernance est dans une situation catastrophique en Afrique. À cela s'ajoute, conclut l'article, l'impasse économique due à une mauvaise gestion des ressources de l'État.
Mots clés: migration volontaire, travail, Afrique subsaharienne, politique, conflits.

Introduction

Since the end of the Second World War has the African continent faced refugee out-flows of huge complexity and scale. Smugglers have capitalized on the political tensions in Sub-Saharan region to move people into various parts of West Africa and outside the sub-region. Many people struggled to escape from political conflicts, ethno-religious conflicts, civil strife and wars to seek political asylum in other areas. Smugglers too are exploiting the political vacuum in Libya to transport Africans across the Mediterranean to Italy.

Asylum-seekers' preference for certain parts of Sub-Saharan Africa and Europe over others created unpleasant attitudes at borders and tensions between governments. Some European Union countries have resorted to security measures to keep migrants out; others have also attempted to "externalize" border controls by transforming them into a "buffer zone" in order to reduce migratory pressures at Europe's southern border. Indeed, they have done so by putting pressure on few North African countries to clamp down on irregular migration, toughening immigration law and to re-admit irregular Sub-Saharan migrants from Europe and expelling them from their own national territories.

Put succinctly, states have a sovereign right to control who crosses their borders because irregular migration and asylum seekers may provide channels for potential terrorists to enter their countries. Many states in Europe believe that most of the migrants participate in illegal activities and that they are associated with the spread of infectious diseases, such as HIV/AIDS. With these, what are the consequences that voluntary migrants and political asylum seekers are likely to face in their chosen new country and how would they overcome many of the problems if they are term irregular migrants. How would they also overcome state policies in relation to the control of irregular migration? However there exist immigration policies for any Africans intend migrating into any European member countries as asylum seeker. This is possible in order for them to migrate legally if they are determined and they will not have any cause paying people smuggler.

Significantly, all European Union member countries have some form of residence permit issued to Third-Country nationals. Only that residence permits issuance varies among them especially between Africans particularly those from Sub-Saharan Africa. For instance, in European Union -27 member countries, for family reasons France

issued close to 227,000 permits, Spain issued 193,000 and Italy issued 179,000 between year 2008-2010.

Immigration Policies of the EU Member Countries: Implications for Africans Seeking Asylum

The Schengen Area comprises all of the European Union (EU) member states except Ireland and the United Kingdom, plus Iceland, Norway and Switzerland. In order to migrate legally to Europe either for seeking of greener pasture or political asylum citizens of all African states are required to acquire a Schengen short-stay visa for entry to the Schengen Area for periods up to three months, either a long-stay visa or a residence permit for periods of three to twelve months, and a residence permit for any stay longer than a year. A long-stay visa or residence permit granted by any Schengen Area country then allows free entry into any other member country for a stay of up to three months in any six-month period. Through this process, such migrant will not be counted or regarded as illegal migrant in his/her country of destination.

Schengen Visas, Residence Permits and Processing Asylum Seekers

Applications for Schengen visas from Sub-Saharan Africa, relative to population, are half that of non-African Third-Countries for which visas are required, while the application rate from North Africa is more than quadruple from Sub-Saharan Africa .The outcomes of any application process of this sort are clearly driven both by the profile of applicants and by decisions of the various authorities; indeed, the two typically interact, with the likelihood of approval affecting applications and vice versa. Nonetheless, the joint interaction of these two forces results in a much higher refusal rate for African applicants than for the rest of the world on average, with particularly high refusal rates of North Africans (Hobolt, 2011). In 2009, a European Union Council Directive introduced a new Blue Card to allow highly-skilled, non-European Union citizens to work in the

Schengen member countries (except Denmark). This is designed as a one-stop application procedure to expedite entry and carries certain rights, especially with respect to family accompaniment. Some European Union countries use this to target specific skills of entrants, but not all member states have yet ratified the law and at least initial use of this device appears to have been very limited, though no statistics have yet been released.

More generally, all European Union member countries issue some form of residence permit to Third-Country nationals and in 2002 new European Union regulations laid down a uniform format for these residence permits. About three quarters of the first-time residence permits issued by the European Union during this interval were for long stays of more than one year. However, there is considerable issuing-country variation in this regard; Denmark and United Kingdom do not issue short-stay permits, while Cyprus and the Netherlands strongly favour short stays. Predictably, the number of permits granted to North African citizens is very large relative to population, though permits to citizens of Sub-Saharan Africa countries are roughly in line with the rest of the world. The reasons for granting these permits differ substantially between Africans and others. Africans, particularly those from Sub-Saharan Africa, receive a smaller portion of their permits for remunerated activities, with permits for seasonal work in Europe being more common among North Africans. Africans also receive a smaller portion of their permits for educational purposes, compared to the rest of the world; on the other hand, per capita of home population North Africans receive far more residence permits for education than does the rest of the world, while Sub-Saharan Africa receives far less.

Residence permits to Sub-Saharan Africans as refugees or for other humanitarian reasons clearly stand out, especially in Malta, the Netherlands and Sweden. For most of the individual European Union

countries, however, family reunification is the single largest reason cited for issuing residence permits to Africans, with France issuing the largest number of such permits (Giubilaro, 1997). Indeed residence permits issued for family reasons by France, Spain and Italy alone amounted to more than a quarter of all permits issued, for all reasons, by the European Union- 27 within year 2008-10. The cited reasons for granting residence permits may provide some insight into the decision processes of the granting countries, yet the cited reason is frequently not indicative of ensuing activities; persons granted permits as family members, refugees or students may well work. Moreover, particularly within the Schengen Area, the issuing country is not necessarily the country of residence.

This last point has proved contentious in the treatment of asylum seekers. From 2000 to 2010, Africans represented 23 percent of the total applications for asylum to the European Union-27, with more than 91 percent of the African applications coming from Sub-Saharan Africa. The recognition rate of these applications for asylum in the European Union was only 13 percent among those from Sub-Saharan Africa and less than eight percent among North Africans, though this is in-line with the nine percent (Giubilaro, 1997). Both joining European Union citizens and joining non-citizens are important categories of family reunification. Intriguingly, however, in both cases the family reunifications are not recorded as joining a spouse, child or even other family member of the person. Family reunification has played an important part in French migration from Africa at least since the shift in French immigration policy away from guest-workers in 1974. (Giubilaro, 1997).

Despite the higher recognition rate of Africans seeking asylum in North America, the absolute number of positive responses from the European Union-27 exceeded those in North America by nearly sixty percent; relatively few (and probably a very select set) of African

asylum seekers manage to reach North America. On the other hand, selection has resulted in more than 875 thousand rejected (or case otherwise closed) African asylum seekers in the European Union since year 2010-2017 had risen up to 25 million for instance, the number of emigrants from each of the Sub-Saharan countries grew by 50% so also more than 17% worldwide average increase for the same period (Pew Research Centre analysis of the United Nations data, accessed August 30, 2020). A significant but unknown proportion of those rejected actually remain in the European Union, despite a number of government programmes aimed at addressing return. (Koser, 2001).

By 2003, the United Kingdom led a group of European Union countries (notably Denmark and the Netherlands) into exploration of the potential for extra-territorial processing centers for asylum seekers in North Africa and elsewhere, though this has met with limited support from the European Commission. (Afeef, 2006). The Arab spring kindled in December 2010, resulted in flood of asylum seekers from Tunisia, arriving in Italy then moving on to France, led to calls for reform in the basic Schengen agreement itself (http://www.bbc.co.uk/news/world-europe-13189682). As the Arab Spring unfurled across North Africa, Europe became divided in its responses to asylum seekers and was criticized for its lack of willingness to share the burden in taking in refugees (The Guardian International Edition available at https://www.theguardian.com /world/2017/june/13/eu).

European Union Immigration Provisions with African States

Overlaying the EU immigration provisions, several European Union countries have bilateral migration agreements with third-countries, often predating signing of their Schengen agreements but remaining in force. (OECD, 2004). Most of these bilateral agreements are with non-African states. However, France has had guest and seasonal worker agreements with each of the Maghreb countries since the

early 1960s; the Netherlands also had a guest worker agreement with Morocco in 1964, while Spain signed agreements with Morocco in 2001 as did Italy with Tunisia in 2000. Meanwhile, Portugal reached a guest worker agreement with Cape Verde in 1997 and Switzerland has a trainee program with a large number of countries, including Morocco and South Africa. The United Kingdom's Working Holidaymaker program in principle entitles youths, ages 18-31, from Commonwealth Countries, to work in the United Kingdom for up to 24 months; however it seems that few Africans have been able to avail themselves of this opportunity. More recently, before the economic downturn, an agreement was reached in 2006 to establish a lottery for 4000 Senegalese to work temporarily in Spain.

In addition, Spain offered funding for training and employment creation for youths in Senegal, in return for cooperation with respect to restraining irregular migration through the Canary Islands. Calls for the integration of migration into wider schemes of development, recognizing the duality of the two, have grown in Europe; these have ranged from co-development schemes, perhaps born in France in the 1970s, to broader calls for coherence in policy strategies with respect to trade, aid and migration. (Cruse, 2005; OECD, 2007a; Department for International Development, 2007). Yet the European Neighbourhood Policy Program, which was developed in 2004 with the aim of promoting development and stability in the European Union's immediate neighbours, including most of North Africa, hardly addresses migration. (Özden, Sewadeh and Wahba, 2011).

Enforcement and Outcomes of Entry Permits

From 2008-2019 about 718,000 non-European citizens were refused entry into the European Union – 27. So also close to 10% more non-European union citizens were found to be illegally present in the European Union 27 in 2019 compared with 2018. But 142,000 non-European Union citizens were returned outside of the European

Union – 27 in 2019, 2% fewer than in 2018. (https://es.europa.eu/eurostat/statistics-explained/index.php/enforcement-of-) In fact, Spain alone reports refusing entry to well over a million North Africans during this three year interval, virtually all of whom were from Morocco. Yet the efficacy of these border controls is clearly limited; on average over half a million people per year were found to be illegally present in the European Union from 2008-10. Of these, nearly a third was Africans, over half of whom were from Sub-Saharan Africa.

Among Sub-Saharan African citizens, the rate of detention of those illegally present was almost double that from the rest of the world in relation to the number of residence permits issued. France, Italy and Spain each found nearly a hundred thousand Africans illegally present from 2008-2010, with another sixty thousand in the United Kingdom. A 2003 survey of apprehended, clandestine, migrants in Italy, of whom about a quarter are from Liberia, Sudan, Morocco and Senegal, reveals a perception that they would earn 8-10times their pay at home. However, the median cost of an entry trip approximates a year's income at home, some $1500, though most did not report incurring debt to finance the trip. Those apprehended were typically in their mid-20s and intended their family to follow them later. (Chiuri et al., 2007).

The chief routes into the European Union for undocumented migrants from Africa are apparently through the Spanish enclaves, Melilla and Ceuta on the Moroccan coast and the Canary Islands, through Malta, and via some of the Italian islands such as Lampedusa. Irregular migration from North Africa has been common for some time, but has also increased from Sub-Saharan Africa (de Haas, 2008). From Senegal, some make the journey by sea directly to the Canaries; others from Sub-Saharan Africa transit through North Africa, with Agadez in Niger forming a major collecting point for the trans-Sahara

passage. Migrants in North Africa to Europe use numerous land, sea and air routes to reach their desired destination. Along this line, restrictive immigration policies of Europe coupled with intensified migration controls have led to a growing reliance on overland routes.

The trans-Saharan journey is generally made in several stages and might take anywhere between one month and several years. In most cases, on their way, migrants often settle temporarily in towns located in migration hubs to work and save enough money for their onward journey, usually in large trucks or pick-ups. De Haas (2008) claims there may be as many Sub-Saharan Africans residing in the Maghreb as in the European Union. Similarly, although Benghazi in Libya has been a focal shipping point for migrants to Europe, Libya had also been a destination for Sub-Saharan Africans in its own right until the recent regime change. Frontex (The European Agency for the Management of Operational Cooperation at the External Borders of the Member States of the European Union) became operational in 2005 and has been active in patrolling the Mediterranean crossing-points and around the Canaries in an attempt to stem landings by undocumented migrants. From humanitarian groups these attempts have met with criticism, particularly with respect to asylum seekers.

According to De Haas (2008), European Union countries have also attempted to “externalize” border controls towards the Maghreb countries by transforming them into a “buffer zone” to reduce migratory pressures at Europe's southern border. They have done so by pressuring certain North African countries in order to clampdown on irregular migration, as well as toughening immigration law, and to re-admit irregular Sub-Saharan migrants from Europe and expelling them from their own national territories. North African countries have signed readmission agreements with several European countries, often in exchange for development aid and financial and material support for (joint) border controls, and, particularly in Italy,

for a limited number of temporary work permits for immigrants". (De Haas, 2008, pp.11-12).

De Haas (2008, p.10) concludes, "While failing to curb immigration, these policies have had a series of unintended side effects in the form of increasing violations of migrants' rights and a diversification of trans-Saharan migration routes and attempted sea crossing points" (Boubakri, 2004; Cuttita, 2005; Goldschmidt, 2006; Lahlou, 2005; Lutterbeck, 2006, Schuster, 2005; Simon, 2006). Both undocumented entry and over-staying permitted entry are purported to be rampant, though, as usual, no reliable count of the number of irregular migrants is available. Indeed, it seems that many of those detained, refused entry or denied asylum are simply released. (Carling, 2007; De Haas, 2008). In the end, it remains unclear how effective have been attempts to limit entry of Africans into the European Union.

Entry of Africans to the United States and Canada

In the United States, Africans received far less visas, relative to the population of Africa, than did the rest of the world. Since its introduction in 1990, the diversity lottery has become a particularly important vehicle of entry and receipt of permanent residence in the United States for Africans, especially for North Africans. Receiving permanent residence status as a refugee or asylee is also far more common from Africa than elsewhere on average. The United States issues a wide array of temporary visas, representing different bases of admission. Africans receive less United States visas on the basis of employment (including H1B, specialty occupations) and of business transfers (intra-company transfers and treaty traders) compared to the rest of the world. This is counterbalanced by a high portion of Sub-Saharan Africans entering as refugees and Africans more generally admitted for official purposes (government officials and representatives to international organizations). Indeed, a remarkable

quarter of all United States temporary visas issued to Africans in this interval were for such official purposes.

Residence in Canada may be granted on a temporary (including temporary workers, foreign students and refugee claimants) or permanent basis (family class, economic immigrants and refugees). During the interval from 2005-2010, the intake of Africans on both bases was substantially below that from the rest of the world, relative to respective home populations. However, a disproportionate fraction of the intake of permanent residents was of North Africans who received 44 percent of the permanent residence permits during this interval.

Movements in Africa

For most countries in the world, the main policy instruments aimed directly at shaping international migration are various forms of immigration regulation. Before turning to examine the use of regulations in Africa, however, it is worth digressing to remark that certain African states have also made a disturbing use of emigration controls. Some African states have not only sought to restrict exit but have enforced mass expulsion of population groups. This was particularly true in the initial phases of nation-building when, for instance, the government of Idi Amin expelled large numbers of Asians from Uganda in 1972. (Zlotnik, 2003). In 1969, Ghana expelled Nigerian immigrants and in the 1980s Nigeria retaliated by expelling Ghanaians. In 1998, Ethiopia expelled perhaps 75 thousand persons of Eritrean origin, to which Eritrea later responded in reverse.

Such practices have continued into the new century, with the mass expulsion of non-Arabs from Sudan since 2003 as a prime example, or the expulsion of the Arab population from Niger in 2006. Some, but not all, of these mass expulsions have been conducted in the name of repatriating irregular migrants (Adepoju, 1984); this was the case for

the expulsion of Cameroonians from Equatorial Guinea in2004, of Rwandans and Burundians from Tanzania in 2006, the deportation of Zimbabweans from South Africa apparently at a rate of some 200,000 per year prior to a moratorium in 2009, and the expulsion of hundreds of Sub-Saharan Africans from Morocco in 2012, for example. The deposed Tunisian regime of President Zine El Abidine Ben Ali removed the right to travel and refused passports to activist dissidents. (Human Rights Watch, 2001).Harvey & Barnidge (2007).

Over the last three decades, most African states have enacted immigration laws for the first time, though ability to enforce the new regulations is severely limited by lack of resources and the extensive and indefensible land borders already noted. In the early stages, controls tended to be confined to entrants from overseas. More recently attempts to implement entry restrictions on migrants from neighboring African states have increased but with very limited success. Certainly, irregular migration between African states is the norm. (Brennan, 1984; Shaw, 2007). Instead, reliance is frequently placed on limiting employment of irregular migrants by requiring employers to obtain evidence of appropriate documentation. Yet such requirements can typically be implemented only in the formal labor market and very few employers are ever penalized. Under the draconian methods of the apartheid regime, South Africa did prove an exception in being able to limit undocumented border crossings, but even in South Africa the emphasis has now shifted to apprehension after entry (Minnaar, 2001; Waller, 2006).

For example, during Operation Crackdown (a police crime blitz in March 2000) over seven thousand persons, alleged to be undocumented migrants, were arrested. In the process, the police and government have been widely accused of human rights violations. “In practice police officials have interpreted the 'reasonable grounds' test as a right to arrest and detain persons who

look or behave foreign, not from 1990-97 the annual rate of deportations averaged about 112 thousand. In the period from January to August 2006 the annualized rate was 248 thousand. During the 1990s, Mozambicans represented more than 80 percent of those deported, but by 2006 Zimbabweans were half of the deportees. Certainly, the bulk of all deportations are to neighbouring states.

Limited progress has been made toward easing travel document requirements in certain communities. Citizens of Economic Community of West Africa States (ECOWAS) may enter and reside in other member countries without a visa for up to ninety days and ECOWAS also issues a common passport for travel outside of the region. Yet Adepoju (2005) argues that access to employment has nonetheless been restricted by various mechanisms. In 1999 Ghana, for instance, began to require all aliens to register and possess identity cards and Nigeria issued national identity cards starting in 2003 and, as Adepoju (2005, p.8) notes, “Community citizens have been expelled by most Member States”. Given the highly porous borders in most of Africa, it is not evident that agreements on free entry in any of the regional mobility agreements alter mobility very much, though easing access to legal employment may be far more potent.

Processing Refugees

The total Population of Concern to UNHCR in Africa at the close of 2018 was 20.4 million that have been forcibly displaced, while 3.5 million people were asylum seekers Yet even though the Internally Displaced persons dominate in Africa, nearly thirty percent of the world population that had been granted refugee status in other countries of asylum originated from Africa, and Africa provided asylum to nearly a quarter of the world's refugees at the end of 2010. At this point in time, there remained 676,300 asylum seekers from Sub-Saharan Africa in the 27 current member states of the European

Union (EU – 27), up by 11.2% compared with 2018. (https://ec.europa.eu/eurostat/statistics-explained/index.php/asylum-statistics).

How are asylum-seekers processed in Africa and what is the fate of those granted refugee status? Between 2000-2010 1.74 million people originating from an African state applied for asylum in another African state. Decisions are reported by UNHCR on one million of these applications, 47 percent being recognized as refugees, 23 percent were rejected and the remaining cases were otherwise closed. In the recognition rate there is substantial variation across the 45 African countries where decisions are reported, the rate of rejection rising significantly with the level of income. Thus Gabon, one of the highest income countries in Africa, has a recognition rate more in line with European Union recognition rates. Partly as a result, across the 48 African countries that are not small island states, the average stock of refugees from 2001-2010 fell with the level of income. Much of the refugee-burden falls upon the lower income countries within Africa, who nonetheless seem willing to recognize asylum seekers pouring in.

By the end of 2010, UNHCR reports that they were assisting 84 percent of the populations in Africa who were recognized as refugees or in refugee-like circumstances. Yet this certainly does not mean that all of these were in camps; on average throughout Africa only just over half of the refugees recorded by UNHCR were in camps and refugee centers, notably in East Africa. In other words greater number of the refugees recognized by UNHCR is mixed in with the host population either in rural or urban settings, particularly in South Africa. UNHCR records the gross increase and gross decrease in the numbers of persons counted as refugees during each year. From these a turnover rate can be calculated; the sum of gross increases and decreases relative to the stock of refugees at the start of each year. In the five

years leading to 2016 this gross turnover rate averaged 37 percent amongst refugees in Africa compared to 23 percent in the rest of the world. During this interval only four percent of the gross reductions in the number of refugees in Africa were recorded as resettlements, typically meaning moving on to an industrialized country. In the rest of the world, this resettlement rate was three times greater.

Much remains unknown about the processing of refugees in Africa. Although repatriation from refugee camps may be a major source of the decreases in recorded refugees each year, how many of the substantial number of refugees not in camps are ever repatriated is unclear. The portion of repatriations that are voluntary is difficult to detect and define tens of millions of people were able to return to their places of residence or find other solutions, such as voluntary repatriation or resettlement to third countries by the end of 2019 (UNHCR 2019). No doubt a good deal of diplomatic resolution enters into this estimate (UNHCR, 2015). Large number of persons fleeing violence across African borders simply go unrecorded by UNHCR obviously remains unclear; counting in camps is not easy at the moment of crisis, leave alone those who never reach a camp.

Not much is known about the fate and economic condition of those refugees who go home. An interesting exception is the work of Kondylis (2008) in which she compares agricultural productivity of returned refugees with that of stayers in Rwanda. Kondylis lists several reasons why those who had been displaced may have suffered a loss of skills, affecting their productivity: as a result of the trauma of displacement, the lack of relevant work experience while in camps, through loss of locally specific knowledge upon return to a new environment, and from fractionalization of households diminishing inter-generational transfer of learning. On balance, Kondylis actually finds the returns to labor are higher for those who had been displaced than for those who stayed back noting that this could be attributable

to greater motivation among the former. However, this must be seen in the context of the 1997 (imidugudu) policy of the Government of Rwanda to settle those who had been displaced and to provide them with land. Displaced persons tended to be assigned to higher productivity prefectures and Kondylis finds that controlling for prefecture fixed effects the apparent advantage of returned households in the returns to their labor disappear. Interestingly, given the level of seed inputs, returned households prove more productive in non-imidugudu contexts and Kondylis notes the possibility this may reflect learning from local stayers in such contexts as opposed to being surrounded by other returned families in the imidugudu settlements (Kondylis, 2014).

Study Abroad

Study abroad is not only a form of migration in its own right but may, potentially; contribute to the extent of more permanent departure of the highly-skilled. Both domestic and host country policies shape the extent to which tertiary level education takes place abroad. Domestic policy matters in determining the extent to which students complete secondary education and are qualified for tertiary education anywhere; in the quality and private cost of college education provided at home; and in subsidizing the cost of study abroad. Host countries impact study abroad both through provision of student visas and through off-setting costs.

In 2008 there were 328 thousand African students studying, full time or part time, outside of their country of origin at a private or public tertiary institution. About 20 percent of Africans studying in colleges outside of their own country were elsewhere in Africa. Seventy-two percent of internationally mobile students from Southern Africa and a third of those from East Africa were at African institutions, virtually all of them in South Africa, though from West Africa about five percent were in Morocco (Malan, 2001). Europe, however, dominates in

training Africans abroad: France alone was educating nearly a third of Africans studying at the tertiary level abroad in 2008 and this ratio was sixty percent of North African students. The US and UK take much smaller numbers, both having around ten percent of African students abroad, though both host relatively large numbers of West Africans.

Employment Situation of African Migrants

Some insights can also be gained into the employment situation of African migrants, both skilled and less-skilled, at least in the OECD countries in 2000. Overall, the unemployment rates among this set of Africans declined with the level of education and were significantly greater amongst those from North Africa and for females, given the education level. Among North African women with less than secondary education completed, the unemployment rate exceeded thirty percent (OECD, 2010). The few low-skill Africans in the US (perhaps primarily refugees) have fairly high unemployment rates; however, the tertiary educated Africans in the US have substantially lower unemployment rates than do their counterparts in OECD Europe (and the difference is probably too large to be explained by differences in definition of unemployment).A potential explanation for the high unemployment of tertiary-educated Africans in Europe is a mismatch in terms of the type of tertiary training. To some extent this seems true; the unemployment rate among Africans with college training in some form of 'general programme'proves insignificant; the fixed effect of countries that send more students abroad is thus equally correlated with the brain-drain rate in both time periods.

The 2000 OECD data point to about two-thirds of tertiary-educated African males and females employed in what might be deemed professional and technical occupations in United States terminology (United States Census Bureau occupation codes 1-10). Direct comparisons with Europe are not possible, given the differences in occupational classification schemes; however, of the tertiary

educated Africans who are in employment in the OECD countries of Europe, about 80 percent of both males and females, from both south and north of the Sahara, are employed in essentially professional and technical occupations. Even among the Africans in Europe with only a primary education or less, performance of general laboring jobs is fairly rare among men, though less so among women). The United States labour market leaves less highly-trained Africans unemployed compared to Europe. Instead, the United States leaves a slightly higher fraction of tertiary educated Africans performing less demanding occupations.

Migration and Security Context

From a number of African countries, the diaspora in Europe have organized home associations that serve as convivial meeting places. Following an examination of these African associations, (Mercer et al., 2008, p.231) conclude that "It is naïve to imagine that home associations are not engaged in political work. Embracing home associations as development providers means tolerating their political work." From case studies of five Ghanaian Home Associations in the Netherlands, matched with information on the respective home towns, Mazzucato and Kabki (2009) are able to describe some of the influences of such associations. Migrant members gain power and prestige by investing in development projects at home; interest in these gains stems partly from intent to return home, at least to be buried (an important tradition in Ghana).

Africa's diaspora has also included a number of individual activists and opposition groups committed to various forms of change in their home country. Yeebo (2008) notes that "these groups became the only viable platforms for campaigning against one party dictatorship and for constitutional reform in some African countries" adding "Some of these exiles who settled in London, the United States and other parts of the world, helped to fund and organize the armed

opposition". Perhaps the best known of such opposition activities from abroad was that of the Pan-Africanist Congress, a wing of the African National Congress (ANC), working against the South African apartheid regime during the 1960s and 1970s. ANC cadres then operated from Tanzania and Zambia under the leadership of Oliver Tambo, who was himself based in Muswell Hill, London (CNN, 2012).

Given the lack of educational institutions in Africa during colonial times it is unsurprising that many of Africa's founding fathers in the newly-independent states, as well as a number of subsequent leaders, were educated in Europe and the United States. Of the 43 initial political leaders on whom information has been compiled for present purposes, 23 had either been educated or lived abroad prior to taking office. The median polity score during the years in office of these initial political leaders returning from abroad is -7 on a scale from -10 (fully autocratic) to +10 (fully democratic); the median for those educated in Africa is identical.161 The legacy of Africa's first presidents is mixed. Less than half of the first presidents left office voluntarily, or lost an election, or died of natural causes while in office; the remainder was removed in some form of coup d'état, nearly a third losing their lives in the process. In this aspect, there is little difference between those educated abroad versus at home. For the most part, despite the many violent endings, there was little change in the polity index over the following five years after the departures of the first presidents, no matter whether they were locally or foreign trained (CNN, 2012). Whether this indicates that the many heads of state who returned from abroad left a strong political legacy, or this simply reflects the nature of the specific countries and tenacity of their societies cannot be discerned from this.

In addition to any influence of the diaspora and returned migrants upon politics in their home country, attention has been given to the effects of refugees upon the political situation in their African

countries of asylum. Salehyan and Gleditsch (2006) cite, for example, the role of Rwandan refugees in deposing Ugandan president, Milton Obote, in 1985. (See also Salehyan, 2009). In the absence of such overlaps, tensions can certainly arise between refugees and the indigenous populations. Betts (2009), drawing upon examples from Tanzania, Uganda and Zambia, considers the circumstances under which Targeted Assistance Development can generate a win-win situation, addressing such tensions. Resentment of immigrants is, however, by no means confined to refugees and, for example, the rather blatant xenophobia that has emerged in South Africa has certainly attracted substantial political attention. (Neocosmos, 2010).

Over the last couple of decades, but increasingly after 2001, the intersection between migration and security has become a major focal point. (Weiner, 1993; IOM 2010). Contrasting perceptions of the role of Africa in this context persist. Beyond such intercontinental concerns, certain aspects of the intersection between migration and security within Africa itself have also attracted mixed attention. The influx of Darfur refugees from Sudan into Chad, joining those from the Central African Republic and the internally displaced from Chad's own long-standing civil war, touches on at least two of these aspects: in 2004, Sudanese militia, pursuing refugees from Darfur, clashed with Chadian troops; then, in 2006, Chad severed diplomatic ties with Sudan, accusing Sudan of supporting the rebels who had attacked N'Djamena, the capital of Chad (Lyman & Morrison, 2004; Ploch, 2010,p.1).

Some African refugees have certainly acted to destabilize their own country of origin or even third countries. “Refugee camps located close to the boundary of the country of origin can provide sanctuary to rebel organizations, and a base from which to carry out operations and fertile grounds for recruitment”. (Gomez et al., 2010; 13). For example, the Rwandan Patriotic Army, which was formed largely of

refugees in Uganda, invaded Rwanda in 1990. “Another example is the recruitment of Liberian refugees by insurgent movements in Sierra Leone that caused destabilization and violent conflicts during the second half of the 1990s” (Hoffman, 2007; Gomez et al, 2010: 14).

Africa's porous borders infuse several insurgent groups with cross-border influences, drawing combatants across both sides of national boundaries. Al-Shabaab in Somalia is reported to have recruited Kenyan and other foreign members, while Ethiopian and Kenyan troops have fought Al-Shabaab in Somalia and Al-Shabaab fighters have attacked Kenya and its Somali refugees (http://www.reuters.com/article/2012/05/30/us-shabaab-east-africa-idUSBRE84T0NI20120530; http://www.bbc.co.uk/news/world-africa-15336689);the rebellion by the traditionally nomadic Tuareg stretches across both Mali and Niger and led to a coup against President Touré of Mali in 2012; and the extensive borders that Cameroon and Niger share with northern Nigeria pose a potential treat from Boko Haram. (Salifu, 2012).

Conflict is not the only form of violence with which migration intersects. The lack of data notwithstanding, Addo (2006) presents a credible documentation of the role of transnational crime syndicates in drug smuggling, small arms trade, human trafficking and recruitment of child soldiers among the ECOWAS countries, facilitated by the acceptance of free movement of persons within the regional economic community. Moreover, violence against women in the forms of sexual abuse and trafficking is prevalent in the context of Africa's rampant flights from conflict (Gomez et al., 2010: 12; Martin 1992, 2004 & La Mattina 2012). Migration is surely not the prime cause of conflict in Africa. Instead, some combination of greed (desire to loot resources, particularly minerals in the African context), grievance (including relative deprivation and ethnicity), viability of rebellion and the institutional context have been put forth as the main

contenders in a largely unresolved literature on the causes of civil war (Collier and Hoeffler (2004; Collier et al. 2009; Murshed and Tadjoeddin 2009; Querido, 2009). Yet the various forms of international movements of Africans have also, on occasions, enabled and even provoked political change, conflict and violence in its manifold forms.

Conclusion

Africa is too diverse, and the evidence to date too sparse, to pronounce grandiose predictions about the future of migration in Africa. Yet perhaps some useful lessons do emerge from the foregoing review (Black, 2004; Sall, 2005; Gubert ,2005, 2007). Sub-Saharan Africa is not only the epicenter of constant violence between rebel groups and the military, but also hosts a considerable proportion of IDPs and refugees from neighboring countries. African migration has been dominated by movements within the continent and, at least over the last half century, there is no indication that distance per se has become less of a deterrent to migrants from Africa. The evidence points to rising domestic incomes being associated with a shift toward longer distance, inter-continental moves.

Whatever is the shape of future migration, it will also feedback on Africa's economic performance. The little existing evidence suggests that emigration from Africa has been associated with enhanced exports, though with wide variations across African states, the largest effect being in North Africa. Emigration is also associated with greater imports and future emigration from Africa may thus result in greater openness to trade. However, the projected net effect on Africa's balance of trade appears small. Moreover, Africa is actually already quite open to trade and has made progress with some elements of trade liberalization.

A category of emigrants that continues to attract particular attention in Africa are the highly-skilled. Education in Africa seems to be positively correlated with growth; perhaps it is even causal. Meanwhile, the fraction of tertiary-educated Africans outside of Africa is extraordinarily high. The signs point to future, increasing emigration of highly-skilled Africans on two grounds: the immigration policies of the destination states and expanding education of Africans. Although there seems a consensus that the EU Blue Card is too narrow in scope to impact African emigration in any major way, the number of tertiary educated Africans in OECD Europe had already doubled from 1990 to 2000, with a particular concentration of college educated West Africans. Despite the lottery scheme, the US continues to issue relatively few visas to Africans compared to their numbers, yet the US hosts the plurality of the tertiary educated emigrants from SSA.

The numbers enrolled in domestic tertiary institutions has grown but remains low, especially in the lower income states; in addition, enrolment has expanded more rapidly than financial commitment to higher education, raising concerns about the quality and efficacy of such training. Of even deeper concern, however, is the lag in expansion of secondary education that feeds into the higher education system. To date, much of Africa continues to rely heavily upon study abroad for tertiary education and there is evidence that this strategy in turn may contribute to the high rate of brain-drain. Emigration of the highly-skilled is thus exceptionally high and likely to increase, but should this be a source of concern? The partial, existing evidence does point to a mitigating, induced-education effect among those still at home, resulting from emigration of the tertiary-educated. There are also serious questions with respect to how effectively educated migrants would be deployed if they remain at home, and relatively little is known of the experiences of those who return (perhaps because return is rare).

Prospects for development will also be markedly shaped by any continuation in the incidence of conflict. Several African nations remain in a state of failure and the number of major episodes of violence shows no significant downward trend from 1980-2015. Besides swaying development, the continuance of conflict will impact intra-regional migration; few African refugees are lucky enough to be resettled in the high-income regions. Frequent assertions to the contrary, the flight of African refugees behaves quite differently from departures of their non-refugee-migrant counterparts. Violence is associated with higher levels of non-refugee emigration, even given income levels, but the impact on refugee flows is far greater, as one might expect. Not only are refugees far more likely to move over shorter distances and to contiguous states in particular, but refugees are more commonly found in states with even lower incomes than at home. Unless Africa is able to resolve their continuing conflicts, refugee movements within the continent will persist, disabling development efforts in neighboring countries that harbor the asylum seekers.

Apprehensions of Africans, present without documentation, continue on a large scale. But many of those apprehended actually manage to remain in Europe, as do rejected asylum seekers. In the absence of more effective screening and better coordination among the EU member states, future African migration into Europe is likely to be shaped mostly by the supply of migrants not by controls. Given the troika of rising intercontinental moves as Africa develops though with little chance of significantly closing the income gap with Europe, projected massive population expansion, and no indication of declining conflict, the pressures on Europe of African migration will surely increase.

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